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Abstract
The idea of ‘developing’ Sind has been a lynchpin of government action and
rhetoric in the province during the twentieth century. The central symbols
of this ‘development’ were three barrage dams, completed between 1932 and
1962. Because of the barrages’ huge economic and ideological significance, the
ceremonies connected with the construction and opening of these barrages
provide a unique opportunity to examine the public presentation of state
authority by the colonial and postcolonial governments. This paper investigates
the way that ideas of ‘development’ and ‘modernity’ appeared in discourses
connected with these ceremonies, in order to demonstrate that the idea
of imposing ‘progress’ on a province considered ‘backward’ by the state
administrators survived longer than the British regime which had introduced
it. The paper begins with the historical links between water-provision and
governance in Sind, before examining the way that immediate political concerns
of the sitting governments were addressed in connection with the projects,
demonstrating the ways in which very similar projects were cast as symbols
of different political priorities. The last part of the paper draws out deeper
similarities between the logic of these political expressions, in order to
demonstrate the powerful continuity in ideologies of ‘progress’ throughout mid-
twentieth century Sind.
Introduction
The idea of ‘developing’ Sind has been a lynchpin of government action
and rhetoric in the province during the twentieth century. The most
important single element of development during the mid-twentieth
century was the massive extension and renovation of Sind’s irrigation
system and the corresponding increase in acreage of land available
for cultivation. The central symbols of this development were three
179
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barrage dams—the Lloyd Barrage at Sukkur completed in 1932, the
Kotri Barrage completed in 1955, and the Gudu Barrage completed in
1962. This paper will examine the way that ideas of development and
modernity were inscribed in discourses surrounding the ceremonial
events connected with these projects, in order to demonstrate that
the idea of imposing progress on a province considered backward
by its administrators survived longer than the British regime which
had introduced it. Because of the vital agricultural and economic
importance of the Barrages to Sind, these ceremonies were major
events, in which the harnessing of a capricious natural resource (the
River Indus) signified the rulers’ mastery over their territory. As such,
the ceremonies provide a unique window onto the public presentation
of state authority before and after Independence.
The power of ritual in locating states in relation to the peoples whom
they govern is well-known to the humanities. In terms of colonial India,
this scholarship has considered a range of angles, from the shift from
princes to nationalist leaders participating in imperial ceremonies
during the twentieth-century Raj,1 to the tension produced by the way
that ceremonies function as a performative arena for diverse interests
at the same time as the hegemony of the organizer is asserted over the
actors.2 The question of ‘performativity’ in the postcolonial state has
also been considered, especially by Mbembe in the African context.3
In the context of South Asian irrigation, Tennekoon has illuminated
the way in which state-led rituals connected with river-development
projects in Sri Lanka have established the material conditions of
modernization and the privileging of science and technology in
association with a centralized state bureaucracy.4 Such an approach
has not been taken to development in Pakistan. Important work by Ali,
Islam, and Gilmartin on British-era canal colonies in the Punjab have
not looked beyond Independence, and have not extended their analysis
1 Douglas Haynes, ‘Imperial Ritual in a Local Setting: The Ceremonial Order in
Surat, 1890–1939’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1990), pp. 493–527.
2 Alan Trevithick, ‘Some Structural and Sequential Aspects of the British Imperial
Assemblages at Delhi: 1877–1911’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1990),
pp. 561–578.
3 Achille Mbeme, On the Postcolony (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001),
especially Chapter 3.
4 N. Serena Tennekoon, ‘Rituals of Development: the Accelerated Mahavali
Development Program of Sri Lanka’, American Ethnologist, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1988),
pp. 294–310.
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beyond the Punjab province.5 Although histories of Sind have taken
British canal-construction into account,6 relatively little is understood
about how the relationship between irrigation and state changed after
1947.
This paper is not a detailed analysis of the ceremonies so much
in terms of ritual and performance, rather (whilst bearing in mind
the impact that the performativity of ceremonies has) they are
treated as moments in which the state’s hegemony over the native
people and environment were most forcefully asserted. Furthermore,
the ceremonies provided anchors for public discussions about the
projects, and about the state of development in Sind more generally,
and revealed the continuing importance of the idea that bringing
progress to Sind was the preserve—and duty—of those in power.
Yet despite changing political contexts, the ceremonies displayed
striking similarities in their deployment of the idea of ‘progress’.
The terms ‘development’, ‘modernity’ and ‘progress’ in the Imperial
and Pakistani lexicons were politically and morally loaded and,
crucially, were considered to be the domains of the state and its
agents. Moreover, all participants and commentators seemed to
welcome the Barrages, even though the potential problems of water-
logging and salinity were well-known beforehand. Within English-
language media, the projects were almost universally cast as bringers
of productivity and prosperity. Indeed, they were considered the
solution to Sind’s notorious backwardness, which was thought to
have been a product of the province’s socio-economic order, and
of the irregularity of crop-cultivation which resulted from farmers’
dependence on the unpredictable Indus for irrigation water. There
were, of course, differences too. Most importantly, the type of
progress promoted by the British administration was almost entirely
technological. After Independence, the rhetoric also turned on Sind’s
supposedly ‘feudal’ society. These differences represented responses to
5 Imran Ali, The Punjab under Imperialism, 1885–1947 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1988); M. Mufakharul Islam, Irrigation, Agriculture and the Raj:
Punjab, 1887–1947 (New Delhi: Manohar, 1997); David Gilmartin, ‘Migration and
Modernity: The State, the Punjabi Village, and the Settling of the Canal Colonies’, in
Ian Talbot and Shinder Thandi (eds), People on the Move: Punjabi Colonial and Post-Colonial
Migration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 3–17.
6 David Cheesman, Landlord Power and Rural Indebtedness in Colonial Sind, 1865–1901
(London: Curzon Press,1997), pp.30–77; Hamida Khuhro, The Making of Modern Sindh:
British Policy and Social Change in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999), pp. 153–169.
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the political challenges facing the respective governments. However,
the representation of the state’s relationship with modernity was
almost identical. British mastery over Indians in the material
and technological fields, and Indians’ reciprocal preoccupation with
‘culture’ and ‘spirit’, was a well-established binary in colonial-
nationalist dialogues by the 1930s, and has received a great deal
of important critical attention.7 British discussions of the Lloyd
Barrage project certainly provide reinforcing evidence for this body
of scholarship. This paper goes further in exploring some of the
continuities between British-Indian and Pakistani attitudes towards
the problem of development and infrastructure-construction in Sind,
in order to highlight the carrying-over of British colonial ideology into
the post-independence state.
The sources used fall into two groups: records of the speeches
which were made by government personnel at the ceremonies, and
commemorative booklets issued there, and contemporary newspaper
reports.8 Of the latter, the focus remains on the opening ceremonies,
but other relevant articles have been included to provide more
evidence of the progress-discourse. The sources used are all in the
English language, which was the language of governance in British-
ruled Sind and in post-Independence Pakistan, and was therefore used
at the opening ceremonies, and for reports in important national
newspapers. Moreover, one of the components of the ideology of
progress was the opposition between officials and the educated elite’s
approach to the projects, as well as the ‘parochial’, discountable
objections raised by ‘backward’ Sindhis.9
7 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Post-colonial Histories
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 6–11.
8 Research for this paper failed to reveal any official material or newspaper articles
concerning the Gudu Barrage opening ceremony in 1962. Therefore, the narrative of
the Gudu foundation-stone-laying ceremony has been used.
9 The vernacular press in Sind sometimes took issue with the way that the projects
were constructed, and worries abounded among zamindars outside the areas which
the projects irrigated. But the response of the Anglophone community—British and
Indian/Pakistani—was often derisive. For instance, an article in the Bombay-based
Times of India in 1930 refused to ‘[A]ccept the definition of the more moderate of the
Sind journals we have referred to above that “by the word foreigner we mean all non-
Sindhis”; and it is hardly to be expected that such an interpretation will appeal to the
people of this [Bombay] Presidency whose credit stands pledged for the repayment of
the vast sums which are being expended on the Lloyd Barrage Scheme’. This clearly
iterates the financial imperative behind discounting Sindhi opposition to the scheme
[‘Land in the Lloyd Barrage Area’, Times of India (Bombay), 5 May, 1930. Collected in
India Office Records (IOR) Private Papers, MSS EUR E 372/2]. After Independence,
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This paper initially sets out the long historical links between water-
provision and governance in Sind, to show why the projects were
executed on a practical political level. The next section examines
the way that the short- and medium-term political needs of the
sitting governments were rhetorically addressed in connection with
the projects, and demonstrates the ways in which very similar projects
were cast as symbols of different political priorities. The final section
draws out the deeper similarities between the logic of these political
expressions, in order to demonstrate the powerful continuity in
ideologies of ‘progress’ throughout mid-twentieth century Sind, and its
British Indian and Pakistani regional surroundings. These ideologies
centred on the distancing of nature from ‘scientific’ man, with Sindhi
cultivators considered to be closer to nature than their British or
Pakistani masters—and therefore the distancing was replicated in
relations between the governors and the majority of the population.
For both colonial and independent governments, this crystallized
around the idea that ‘backward’ Sind could be economically and
morally improved by the imposition of a scientific irrigation system on
the countryside, and scientific cultivation on the agrarian populace,
with the Barrages as monuments to the material power of the adepts
of scientific knowledge.
Water and governance in Sind
Governance in Sind has long been intimately connected to the control
of water. Almost nothing will grow there without receiving water from
the river, either by flooding or through canals. The Indus was famously
integral to the ancient Mohenjodaro civilization. More recently,
Sind’s Kalhora rulers (1700–1783 CE) expanded and improved the
canal system. Their successors, the Talpur Mirs (1783–1843) were
less effective in this regard, but did take some responsibility for
maintaining the canals.10 The Mirs’ own successors, the British,
inherited a wide-ranging and sophisticated canal system. However,
it was a truism among early British officers in Sind that the Mirs had
the tension between ‘provincial’ and ‘national’ concerns became a defining feature of
the idea of ‘nation-building’—an ideology in which large-scale development projects
such as construction of the Barrages played a defining role.
10 M. H. Panhwar, History of Sind Irrigation: 3500 B.C.–Present (Islamabad:
Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Science and Technology, Pakistan Council of
Research in Water Resources, 1991), p. 66.
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ruined the canal system through neglect of their duty to clear silt and
sediments from the channels every year, thus impeding the water’s
flow.11
Under the British, Sind remained dependent on canal irrigation, as
did much of north-western India: particularly parts of the Punjab, the
North-West Province and the North-West Frontier Province. Parallels
were also drawn between Sind and other parts of the British Empire,
such as Egypt and Sudan.12 However, British Sind lagged far behind
its neighbours in irrigation development. In the North-West Province,
East India Company engineers had begun renovating the Western
and Eastern Jumna Canals as early as the 1820s. In 1840, work had
started on the Ganges Canal, to irrigate the whole of the Upper
Doab.13 All over northern India, administrative power and water
provision were intimately connected, and the government invested
a great deal of capital in strengthening this relationship. But in Sind,
the physical infrastructure that facilitated it was allowed to remain
virtually unchanged, despite the repeated attempts of officials in Sind
to put up major canal projects.14
This neglect had become a political liability by the early twentieth
century. Writing in support of the proposal to build a Barrage at
Sukkur, the Commissioner-in-Sind argued in 1920 that:
It is open for agitators at present to point out that comparatively little has
been done in Sind of recent years in the way of great works by Government.
[. . .] The undertaking of a great scheme such as that now proposed in Sind
would undoubtedly have an excellent effect.15
11 Panhwar cites James Hughes, Deputy Collector of Shikarpur in 1847, and
Richard Burton. M. H. Panhwar, History of Sind Irrigation, p. 73; Lieutenant Postans,
writing in 1841, is cited by E. H. Aitken, Gazetteer of the Province of Sind (Karachi:
‘Mercantile’ Steam Press for the Government [of Bombay?], 1907), p. 258.
12 See Robert Burton Buckley, Irrigation Works in India and Egypt (London: E. & F.N.
Spon,1893); Anonymous, ‘Lord Stanley & the Lloyd Barrage’, n.d., IOR Private Papers
MSS EUR E 372/1. Conversely, when Britain was given the post-First World War
Mandate in Palestine by the League of Nations, Indian irrigation experiences helped
to guide the new administration. K. Gaarde, ‘British Colonial Water Legislation in
Mandatory Palestine’, in R. Coopey and T. Tvedt, A History of Water, Volume 2: The
Political Economy of Water (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), p. 178.
13 Graham P. Chapman, The Geopolitics of South Asia: From Early Empires to the Nuclear
Age. 2nd Edition (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), p. 119.
14 See Aitken, Gazetteer, p. 262
15 ‘Memorandum by the Commissioner-in-Sind’, dated 14 July, 1920, paragraph 5.
Enclosed with Shourbridge to Secretary to G.o.I. P. W.D., 30 July, 1920. Government
of Bombay, Public Works Department Irrigation (Works and Accounts), A Proceedings for July
1920, IOR P/10797.
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This justification for barrage-building was rooted in the Sind
administration’s current political concerns, in particular about the
success of the Khilafat Movement, which protested against the treat-
ment of the defeated Ottoman Empire by the Allies after the First
World War. By the time the Commissioner’s memorandum was
written, the predominantly urban Khilafat leadership in Sind had
obtained the cooperation of many pirs,16 who brought with them
the massed support of their rural followers. The British authorities
reacted by arresting leading Khilafatists, in line with state action
across India.17 The Commissioner, however, revealed an awareness
of the need for a carrot as well as a stick. He drew explicitly on
the idea of public-works construction as a mark of good governance,
and cast the Barrage as part of a wider process of irrigation-system
construction in India, which could secure the stability of colonial rule.
The Lloyd Barrage, therefore, stood as a symbol of the government’s
vested political interest in cultivation.
Work finally began on the Barrage project at Sukkur in 1923.
The decision had been made partly on the aforementioned political
grounds, partly on the grounds that irrigation development in Punjab
on the Indus tributaries would harm water availability in Sind, and
partly because of the lure of increased revenue receipts which would
accrue from the massive increase in the area that could be put under
profitable crops in the province. The Lloyd Barrage (named after Sir
George Lloyd, the Governor of Bombay who oversaw its inception
and construction) was formally opened by Viceroy Willingdon on
13 January, 1932. Over the remaining 15 years of British rule,
the Barrage system proved its financial and food-producing worth,
especially during the grain-shortage crises of the Second World War.
During that War, outline plans were prepared for two more weirs
on the Indus in Sind: one downstream of Sukkur, to irrigate Middle
and Lower Sind, and the other upstream, to irrigate Upper Sind.18
After the Partition of British India and the creation of Pakistan, water
in Sind and Punjab suddenly became an international issue, when in
16 Pirs are Sufi Muslim spiritual leaders, considered by their followers to be living
saints, who have traditionally wielded considerable temporal power in Sind. Their
followers include both Hindus and Muslims.
17 On the growth and suppression of the Khilafat Movement in Sind, see Sarah
Ansari, Sufi Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sind, 1843–1947 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), pp. 77–100.
18 Government of Sind, Postwar Development Schemes First Edition (Karachi:
Government Press, 1945), pp. 51–68.
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1948 India stopped the flow of water into Pakistan from the Indus
tributaries in its (upstream) half of Punjab. The ensuing dispute was
not resolved until 1960. Moreover, the huge population ‘transfers’
caused by Partition created a desperate refugee problem in Pakistan:
the 1951 Census enumerated seven million people as being of refugee
origin.19 During Pakistan’s first few decades in existence, refugee
rehabilitation was taken as an integral part of national development
by policymakers.20 Pakistan now needed to provide food for its new
population, and to raise cash-crops for export in order to boost its
critically low foreign-exchange reserves. The existing projects for the
new Sind barrages were, therefore, enthusiastically taken up. The first,
to irrigate Lower Sind, was constructed at Kotri, and opened on 15
March, 1955; the second, to irrigate Upper Sind, was constructed at
Gudu, and became operational in March 1962.
The opening ceremonies
The three barrage projects were, therefore, essential in practical terms
to the political and financial survival of the pre- and post-Partition
regimes in Sind. But they were also implicated in how administrators
viewed themselves and their relationship with the public, and vice
versa. The rhetoric surrounding the building of the barrages was
sometimes so forceful and dramatic in scope that they seemed almost
to represent the essence of governance in Sind. They stood as concrete
evidence of the effectiveness with which engineering knowledge could
be deployed by those who had the resources and the political will. This
view was promoted most stridently at public events connected with
the barrages: at the laying of foundation-stones before construction,
and then the formal openings of the new irrigation systems. At
these events, the full pomp of colonial and post-colonial rule was
deployed to mark the importance of such large-scale projects. The
involvement of top state personnel, such as the Viceroy of India, the
Governor-General and (later) the President of Pakistan, emphasized
their extra-provincial significance. At these ceremonies, the everyday
story of concrete, crops and hard cash was forcefully placed into
the grand contexts of the colonial civilizing mission, and Pakistani
19 Ian Talbot, Freedom’s Cry: The Popular Dimension in the Pakistan Movement and Partition
Experience in North-West India (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 154.
20 Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern
South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 9.
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nation-building. Moreover, the profile of these ceremonies—and of
the barrage projects themselves—in the contemporary Anglophone
press followed remarkably similar lines to the rhetoric expressed by
government officials.
On 24 October, 1923, the Governor of Bombay laid the foundation
stone for the Lloyd Barrage. The event took place, according to one
report, ‘Amid scenes of gorgeous splendour, attended with pomp
and ceremony rarely excelled even in the presence of Kings and
Princes’.21 The Executive Engineer of the Barrage’s speech outlined
the history of the project, from its roots in shelved nineteenth-century
irrigation schemes to its sanctioning by the Secretary of State for
India. Thus, he cast the story of the Barrage as one in which the
tenacity of Sind’s British administrators and engineers finally resulted
in the construction of the Barrage system, which would: ‘[C]onvert a
desert into a garden, [and] also ensure prosperity to those cultivators
who[. . .]live on from year to year in that demoralizing atmosphere
which is produced by an uncertain and scanty supply of irrigation
water.’22 The Governor himself continued in a heroic vein, declaring
that: ‘Nothing indeed could be more strikingly indicative of the
magnitude of the problem which this Barrage is to solve than the
long story of the many attempts that have been made to convert
this great waterless tract into a land of rich harvests.’23 Similarly, a
representative of the Hyderabad District Local Board asserted that
the Barrage’s ‘[M]agnificence and the beneficial effects[. . .]are not
excelled by any attempt that has yet been made for harnessing any of
the great rivers of the world’.24 The Governor also expressed an early
indication of the celebration of the Barrage as a material fact which
would become such a strong recurring theme of the later ceremonies:
‘It is hardly possible to imagine how fine an appearance of massive
yet elegant strength this giant work will present to the travellers who
approach it by any of the great main roads which it will serve to
connect’.25
These statements could seem indicative of little more than
self-congratulatory hyperbole. But they demonstrate the Barrage’s
potential as a symbol of human endeavour. Nine years later, at the
21 ‘World’s Greatest Irrigation Project’, The Daily Gazette (Karachi), 25 October,
1923.
22 Quoted in ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
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same Barrage’s opening ceremony in 1932, this valorization had
matured into almost a fetishization of engineering ability—perhaps
encouraged by the fact that, once construction was accomplished, the
actual existence of the Barrage made for a more convincing emphasis
on its material aspects. In a souvenir booklet given out to attendees
at the opening ceremony, this valorization was visually represented
by the 20 pages of the booklet which consisted solely of photographs
of the Barrage and canals, in various stages of completion. In none
of these photographs does any human feature prominently. The shots
are all of machinery and the Barrage structure itself. Human workers,
when they do appear, are dwarfed by the machines they are using
and by the products of their labours. In fact, the only shot which
specifically shows any living creature in close-up is of two donkeys,
with the caption ‘Dumb Workers’.26 For British engineers, their non-
representation in the pictures was offset by a list of their names at
the back of the booklet. For the thousands of Sindhis, Baluchis and
Punjabis who worked on the project there is barely a mention, except
in connection with the operation of plant machinery.
Judging by the souvenir booklet alone, the progress which
the Barrage and canals embodied would seem to be primarily
technological. While the administrative and logistical challenges it
had presented were also mentioned, it was the scientific construction
of the project which received the most attention. At the opening
ceremony of the Kotri Barrage 23 years later in 1955, there was
a similar implication that the type of ‘progress’ embodied by the
new Barrage depended on technological development. Sind’s Chief
Minister, Mohammed Ayub Khuhro, emphasized the Barrage’s visual
impact on the landscape:
While no money has been wasted on purely ornamental or decorative features,
every thought has been given to the appearance of the Barrage so that it
may have the natural good looks of a structure—soundly built, and with
all its parts severely designed to carry out their functions without waste or
grandioseness.27
26 N.a., The Opening of The Lloyd Barrage and Canals by His Excellency The Earl of
Willingdon, G.M.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.M.I.E., G.B.E., Viceroy and Governor General of India on
Wednesday, the 13th January 1932 (Bombay: The Government Central Press, [1932?]),
p. 23.
27 Speech of the Hon’ble Mr. M.A. Khuhro, Chief Minister of Sind, on the occasion of the
Opening Ceremony of the Kotri Barrage by His Excellency the Governor-General of Pakistan on
15th March 1955, p. 4. In United Kingdom National Archives (U.K.N.A.) File DO
35/8581: ‘The Kotri Barrage Project, Pakistan’.
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By making practical and cost-effective construction work into an
aesthetic statement, Khuhro allowed the sheer material solidity of
the dam to stand for the work it represented, and the faith in scientific
agriculture it manifested. In doing so, he followed the logic of the
photographs in the Lloyd Barrage souvenir booklet. Moreover, he now
claimed the same scientific expertise for Pakistan which had previously
been the preserve of the British rulers: ‘The project’, he said, was:
[C]onstructed by Pakistani Engineers and staff with the exception of the
Chief Engineer and a few British Engineers, never more than five and for most
of the time considerably less, who were chiefly required on the mechanical
side. [. . .] With one partial exception, all the canal works are being executed
either directly or by Pakistani Contractors.28
Khuhro was here claiming that Pakistanis had successfully taken on
and reproduced the scientific knowledge which British administrators
had deemed such an important marker of British superiority only
three decades previously. Since the original plans for the Kotri Barrage
had been laid under British administration, this perhaps bordered on
the disingenuous. But by judging the independent state’s action’s by
the same criteria used by the colonial state, Khuhro drew attention
to the similar ideological space which both administrations sought to
occupy.
In both cases, such an emphasis on technical aspects elided
the very important social and political implications of such large
irrigation projects. But Khuhro was not the top state representative
present at the Kotri ceremony, and it was the Governor-General,
Ghulam Mohammad, who took Viceroy Willingdon’s ceremonial
role as the man to formally open the project. The format of
the ceremony seems to have been similar—featuring the country’s
political figurehead, decorative bunting, speeches extolling the
Barrages’ virtues and those of the engineers who had built them—but
Ghulam Mohammad departed from the Sukkur template by directly
addressing contemporary political issues. In particular, he promoted
his government’s ostensibly pro-peasant political stance. The opening
paragraph of his speech declared that:
28 Speech by the Hon’ble Mr. M.A. Khuhro, p. 2.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 29 Aug 2012 IP address: 134.219.64.158
190 D A N I E L H A I N E S
[N]othing gives me greater pleasure than to watch the completion of a project
which directly benefits the common man, and is destined to produce more
food for Pakistan’s millions whose welfare is very dear to my heart.29
The Governor-General went on to emphasize the improvements in
food supply which the Barrage would deliver, and to place the Barrage
in the context of his government’s wider economic and development
policies. All of these statements emphasized the role of the central
government in promoting economic and industrial progress in general,
and agricultural development in particular. Ghulam Mohammad was,
in short, using his speech to promote his own political agenda. This
became much more pronounced in the last part of the speech, in which
he declared that:
[I]n distributing land care should be taken that we do not give such land to
big landlords and thus add to our difficulties. [. . .] In the past, I am afraid,
there has been some lack of fair play in this regard, and I do hope and believe
that the government of Sind shall strain every nerve to mend the conditions
and improve the distribution in the best interest of the common man. [. . .]
The common man, whether a refugee or a local, is the core of our nation and
all our schemes and projects must aim at ameliorating the hardships of his
day to day life.
The appeal to the common man was perhaps inflected by the fact
that Ghulam Mohammad’s central government had begun almost
bypassing democratic processes during the previous year, an act
which foreshadowed Ayub Khan’s 1958military coup. By emphasizing
the state’s relationship with everyday citizens, Ghulam Mohammad
sought to demonstrate a direct identification with the people outside
the political classes, a populist legitimacy for his regime. This
endeavour, of course, represented the finest colonial tradition of
declaring political challengers to be the non-representative ‘elite’,
and, in the same manner as the colonial government, claimed that
the modernist and progressive military and civil bureaucracy ought
to rule a people who were too culturally primitive to be trusted with
democracy. This idea was certainly taken up, to some extent, by the
press. The Karachi-based weekly, Commerce, sought to annex his speech
to its own correspondent’s opinions:
The Governor General did not say this in so many words but we have no doubt
that he felt it as keenly as many people do that in resisting agrarian reforms
29 Speech of His Excellency the Governor-General at the Opening Ceremony of
the Kotri Barrage, 15 March, 1955, p. 2. In U.K.N.A. File DO 35/8581.
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in the country the feudal lords were precipitating conditions which would in
the end spell a disaster for them.30
Here, the use of the word ‘feudal’ suggested an open conflict between
the old and the new: the image was not of a class struggle between big
landlords and their haris (cultivators who worked a landlord’s land),
but of an endangered reactionary group fighting a rearguard action
against the natural—and national—march of progress. Conversely,
the state’s representative, the Governor-General, was associated with
progress. This suggested that the modernization of agriculture, both
technical and cultural, was an inevitable part of the Pakistani national
story. Similarly, a report on the opening ceremony in Dawn stated that:
‘A proud day was recorded in Pakistan’s history when the Pakistan
Governor-General yesterday flew into Hyderabad’ to perform the
opening ceremony.31
The ‘national story’ aspect of the Kotri ceremony was characteristic
of early-independence Pakistan.32 Accordingly, it was repeated at the
foundation-stone-laying ceremony for the Gudu Barrage, which took
place on 2 February, 1957. In an address presented to President
Iskander Mirza by the West Pakistan Minister of Communications
and Works, engineering expertise was presented as fundamental to
national development:
In the development of any country the Engineers have to play a great part.
In our young country we need more Engineers and good Engineers. The task
of constructing this new Nation will mainly fall on their shoulders. [. . .] Our
Irrigation Engineers have already made their mark and I am happy to say
this Barrage is entirely the work of our Pakistani Engineers.33
Mirza, in his reply, enunciated the same theme:
[T]he engineering profession holds a place of honour among the other leading
professions in a nation-building programme. [. . .] The country expects that
30 ‘Kotri Barrage’, Commerce (Karachi), 19 March, 1955.
31 ‘Impressive Ceremony’, Dawn (Karachi), 16 March, 1955.
32 The concept of ‘nation building’ was a favourite post-Independence trope and
covered various aspects of moral and material ‘national progress’. For instance Sind
Information, a Government of Sind journal, carried a column called ‘Towards Nation
Building’, which, to cite one issue, reported on the opening of new workshops, sea
port development, and the functioning of a new labour exchange. ‘Towards Nation
Building’, Sind Information (Karachi), 1:4 (1948), 101.
33 Address presented to Major-General Iskander Mirza, President of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, on the occasion of the foundation stone laying ceremony of Gudu Barrage. In U.K.N.A.
File BT11/5110, ‘Pakistan: Upper Sind or Gudu Barrage’.
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they will live up to their reputation in the execution of this Project and thus
contribute to the building of a better, happier and prosperous Pakistan.34
A commemorative booklet which was issued at the Gudu ceremony
pictorially represented ordinary barrage-workers to a much greater
extent than the Lloyd Barrage booklet had done, but it still supported
the dominance of engineering with a wealth of technical detail
and photographs of earthworks.35 Alongside this by-now familiar
celebration of the project’s materiality, the immediate political
context again formed a theme of the speeches here. The address to
Mirza noted that the integration of Sind (and other former provinces)
into the huge West Pakistan province under the One Unit Scheme36
meant that non-Sindhi land could be irrigated without causing
provincial disputes.37 The Scheme, then, allowed the more rational
implementation of development projects, free of the former provinces’
administrative and political borders. This point had previously been
made—although not in the context of an administratively united West
Pakistan—by an important Sindhi geographer in a newspaper article
as early as 1948. ‘There is no doubt’, he wrote,
[T]hat the concept of ‘region’ has to be developed in the solution of Pakistan’s
problems and the haphazard political boundaries have to be discarded at any
rate. That all artificial political boundaries are a nuisance in our work of
national planning is beginning to be realised at long last. [. . .] No longer
shall we think in terms of the N.W.F.P., West Punjab, Sind, and Baluchistan,
but the main PHYSIOGRAPHIC [sic] regions[.]38
During the ‘One Unit’ period, the West Pakistan administration was
able to take such a regional approach. Moreover, Khuhro’s own speech
at the Kotri ceremony refrained from attacking Punjabis precisely
because he had recently been reinstated as Sind’s Chief Minister by
the federal government on the understanding that he would promote
34 Iskander Mirza, speaking on 2 February, 1957, speech transcribed in U.K.N.A.
File BT11/5110, ‘Pakistan: Upper Sind or Gudu Barrage’.
35 Gudu Barrage Project (N.p.: Directorate of Information, Government of West
Pakistan, n.d.). In U.K.N.A. File BT11/5110.
36 The One Unit Scheme merged Sind with Punjab, Baluchistan, and the North-
West Frontier Province to form a new province called ‘West Pakistan’. It proved to be
unpopular with Pakistani Bengalis, Sindhis, and Balochis, and was reversed by Yahya
Khan in 1970.
37 Address presented to Major-General Iskander Mirza.
38 Maneck B. Pithawalla, ‘Water resources of the dry zones in Pakistan’, Sind Observer
Illustrated Sunday Supplement (Karachi), 26 September, 1948.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 29 Aug 2012 IP address: 134.219.64.158
C O N C R E T E ‘ P R O G R E S S ’ 193
the One Unit Scheme to his Sindhi constituency.39 On a practical level,
the administrative scheme allowed Gudu water to be sent outside the
former Sind province. On an ideological level, it forced a project
that originated with the Sind Government to bend to the rhetorical
requirements of a drive to erase pre-Pakistan political loyalties.
‘Progress’ and ‘modernity’ under changing regimes
The rhetoric displayed at these occasions maintained a remarkable
continuity in the discursive language they deployed. The routine calls
for self-sacrifice in the name of ‘nation building’ in post-Independence
Pakistan suggested a new tone to ideas of development, but irrigation
projects which followed almost identical systemic formats were cast as
emblems of different political regimes in almost identical manners.
Why this continuity? The very emphasis on engineering expertise
as a Pakistani trait seemed to usurp the former colonialists’ claims
to superiority over their erstwhile subjects. But this obsession with
engineering had firm colonial roots in ideas about what ‘development’
was. The attitude of the ruling classes—especially the bureaucrats
and technocrats—in independent Pakistan towards Sindhi agriculture
was almost identical to those of their British predecessors. In both
periods, the Sindhi cultivator was seen as a malleable material onto
which ‘progress’ could be stamped, as the physical landscape could be
manipulated by the Barrages.
The ideas of ‘progress’ which motivated and accompanied the
building of the projects, therefore, ran beyond the valorization of
the Barrages’ materiality. One of the foundations of the way that
the colonial regime perceived and presented the Lloyd Barrage project
was the widely-held attitude that native Sindhi cultivation was slovenly
and ineffective. Many years before the project had been accepted, the
author of the 1907 Sind Gazetteer had lamented the precedence of
leisure over work in Sindhi agrarian culture:
[T]he truth is that, in the absence of competition, ambition and every other
stimulus which urges the husbandman to get the most he can out of his field,
the Sindhi has for generations cherished the gentler ideal of allowing his field
to divorce him as little from his hookah as might be compatible with keeping
the latter filled.40
39 Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of
Defence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 200.
40 Aitken, Gazetteer, p. 240.
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Sindhis were compared especially unfavourably with Punjabis,41
who were considered to be model farmers for arid, canal-irrigated
land. Punjabi peasants had already proved themselves in Sind during
the colonization of Jamrao Canal land, an endeavour in which Sindhi
peasants had fared badly.42 The cause of the Sindhis’ lacking in this
regard was popularly held to be their historic dependence on the
notoriously unreliable Indus, which would rise and fall unpredictably
each summer, so that the correct quantity of water could not be
guaranteed at the correct time for successful cultivation. The Barrage,
by regulating a water supply which the cultivators could rely on for
year-to-year consistency, could remedy this. As one Sind official wrote,
once a stable water supply was assured, ‘[T]he traditional indolence
and fatalism of the Sindhi cultivator may be sought in vain’.43 This
same position was more publicly articulated on the first page of the
Sukkur Barrage souvenir booklet:
The uncertainty of supply, so uncertain that no cultivator has been in a
position to forecast what is likely to happen a fortnight ahead, has led to
haphazard cultivation and the cultivator has felt that kismet [sic] rather
than his own systematic exertions, is the ruling factor in his agricultural
operations. To put an end to this uncertainty [. . .] it was necessary to devise
some means of assuring a level of the water in the river which would permit
of more certain and orderly irrigation conditions.44
The cultivator’s trust in kismat, or fate, was used to draw a
binary opposition between ‘spiritual’ India and the ‘modern’ West.
The cultivator’s close relationship with the Indus also pointed to a
distinction between the Sindhi as limited by the natural world, and
the British engineers as its masters. The ability to bring certainty
and order to the chaotic process of cultivation became a justification
for imposing a new system on the cultivators: physical engineering
intersected with socio-cultural engineering. However partial and
hesitant the latter may have been, it was integral to the rhetoric
which defined the sort of ‘progress’ that the Barrage was expected to
instil. This idea found an even more explicit expression in an article
41 Sarah Ansari, ‘Punjabis in Sind: Identity and Power’, International Journal of Punjab
Studies Vol. 1, No. 2 (1995): pp. 1–21, 6–8.
42 Untitled note by Dow, dated 16 March, 1926, paragraph 8. IOR Private Papers.
MSS EUR E 371/2.
43 Hugh Dow, ‘Note on Sind’, undated (circa mid–late 1920s). IOR Private Papers
MSS EUR E372/1.
44 Opening of the Lloyd Barrage, p. 1.
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published in the Bombay-based, English-language, daily newspaper
the Times of India. The article reported that:
On the morning after the official opening of the Barrage by His Excellency
the Viceroy, there might have been witnessed a second opening ceremony, in
its way no less impressive. A white-bearded and saffron-robed saint from the
north stretched his arms in benediction over each of the canals and in a loud
voice intoned a solemn song of praise and prophecy. He gave rather more
thanks to God and less to the engineers than His Excellency had done, and
was less concerned with history and more with poetry. He looked like a man
from a thirsty land, and his picture of the blessings brought by irrigation was
a vivid one.45
The article also inscribed a fundamental difference between the
material ‘reality’ of the Barrage and the saint’s ‘illusory’ approach to
it, which invoked the irrational fields of prophecy and poetry rather
than the supposedly solid and objective categories of engineering
and history. The audience—expatriate Europeans or English-literate
Indians—naturally ‘knew’ that His Excellency’s praise of the engineers
and historical progress expressed the true facts of the matter. This
again carried the implication that the Barrage, and the engineers
who oversaw its construction, were naturally enmeshed in the slow
stamping of both ‘modern’ ideas and ‘modern’ structures onto the
Sindhi physical and cultural landscapes. It asserted that the Barrage
could be symbolically interpreted by the saint in a different way
to that presented in the official ceremony, but on the other hand,
this suggested that the ability to actually construct it was reserved
to the British-dominated ruling class, whose vision of a productive
Sind would be made a reality through the proper application of
scientific principles. The saint’s irrational, spiritual response to the
fact of the Barrage represented precisely the culture which the project
was credited with helping to reshape. The figure of the saint did
not reappear in post-independence discussions of the Barrages—
not surprising, given the departure of the majority of Sind’s Hindus
at Partition. In fact, any question of ‘spirituality’ was submerged.
Even the hotly-contested place of Islam in the Pakistani state went
unmentioned.46 The article’s wry, implied dismissal of the saint’s way
of engaging with the Barrage as a harbinger of change encapsulates the
45 Times of India, 12 December, 1932.
46 See Andrew Wilder, ‘Islam and Political Legitimacy in Pakistan in Muhammad
Aslam Syed (ed.), Islam and Democracy in Pakistan (Islamabad: National Institute of
Historical and Cultural Research, 1995), pp. 38–40.
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equation of a spiritual/material binary with an Indian/European one, a
phenomenon which underpinned much colonial epistemology. Indeed,
the figure serves to emphasize the material nature of the construction
which underlies the saint’s spiritual texture. The ‘rationality’ which
the dismissal of the saint represents was subsequently carried
smoothly into the post-Independence period, as the postcolonial state
took up the colonial state’s rationalist claim to truth.47 As it did
so, it maintained the distinction between the expertise reserved to
those in government and the inferior knowledge of the population of
Sind.
By contrast, the question of ‘scientific agriculture’ was not merely a
rhetorical device: during and after the Lloyd Barrage’s construction,
the government put a good deal of effort into encouraging Sindhis
towards this type of farming. An experimental farming station was
established in 1925, and a government-sponsored team travelled the
country and taught cultivators new methods. The Chief Agricultural
Officer in Sind also issued public information pamphlets which advised
farmers on the new conditions which would come into existence when
the Barrage project was completed, and recommended the best ways
to grow new crops.48
As we have seen, this emphasis on (British) engineering and
scientific agriculture spoke to a powerful set of assumptions about what
constituted good agriculture, and these same assumptions were then
carried over into Pakistani discussions in almost identical language.
The post-Independence governments in Pakistan issued a wealth
of publications concerning the question of ‘national development’,
and naturally the topic found regular discussion in contemporary
newspapers. Now, the theme of ‘improving’ Sindhi agriculture through
administrative and social reforms became much more pronounced.
The social aspects of agricultural practice had been very important in
the way that the Lloyd Barrage was presented, and to an extent this
was reflected in the land allocation policies which the government
adopted. The land allocation policies for the Lloyd Barrage had
47 This statement takes up Chatterjee’s argument that some nationalist thought
in India took on Western claims to rationality as the truest form of knowledge. Partha
Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: a derivative discourse? (London: Zed
Books, 1986), pp. 14–17.
48 Examples include, Leaflets for distribution in Sind, No. 31 (1023): Improved varieties of
cotton recommended by the Department, and Agricultural Leaflet No. 30 (1st Edition August,
1933): The cultivation of rabi oil-seed crops in the barrage areas of Sind. Issued by the
Government of Bombay Agricultural Department.
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some ‘pro-peasant’ elements, and Hugh Dow, the officer responsible
for formulating this policy, warned his colleagues against allotting
land to ‘landgrabbing big zamindars’.49 However, zamindars were still
given very favourable terms for Lloyd Barrage land. As Ghulam
Mohammad’s speech at the Kotri opening ceremony demonstrated,
this became a much more important theme after Partition. After
Independence, as we have seen, bureaucrats, politicians and the press
often made much greater rhetorical play of the importance of helping
the ‘common man’. For example, an article in Wealth in 1950 argued
that:
The Tenancy Act passed during the Budget Session this year has in a way
liberated 25 lakhs of tillers of soil from the heartless exploitation of some
seven thousand landlords. [. . .] Same [sic] policy will be followed in the Lower
Sind Barrage area also. The allied problems of ‘jagirs’ and their abolition is
also under consideration of the Government.50
Land reforms were painfully slow in coming and, when they did,
had at best a limited impact.51 But the concept played an important
part in defining what kind of nation-state the new Pakistan was to be.
The Barrage-opening ceremonies weighed into the debate by typifying
the materialist, secular discourses which surrounded public works
development during the 1950s and 1960s, and the accompanying
trope of the ‘common man’ as the heart of the nation.
Of course, the question of land and agrarian culture was not confined
to direct discussions of the Barrage. One public-information book,
published by the Government of Sind while the Kotri Barrage was
under construction, carried an article arguing that: ‘The people who
49 Untitled note by Hugh Dow, dated 16 March, 1926, paragrah 43.
50 ‘Sind’s efforts to develop her agriculture and industry’, Wealth (Karachi), 13
August, 1950). Jagir landholdings were large areas on which the master did not pay
land revenue to the government. The ‘problem’ of jagirs, the financial losses to the
state which they represented, and the social and political strength they gave to the
big landlords, had exercised Sind’s administrators ever since Napier’s conquest. The
British in Sind had maintained the status of jagirs to a great degree, and did nothing
significant to challenge their power. On jagirs and land tenure reform in British Sind,
see David Cheesman, Landlord Power and Rural Indebtedness in Colonial Sind, 1865–1901
(Richmond: Curzon, 1997), Chapter 2.
51 Ayub Khan promulgated the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation No. 64
on 7 February, 1959, but it was fatally undermined by loopholes and by cooperation
between landlords and the local revenue authorities, which had the responsibility for
implementing the reforms. Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (Lahore: Vanguard
Books, 1999), pp. 165–166.
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work on the land are condemned by their inefficient methods, to a
life of drudgery[,]’ and that the solution lay in partial mechanization
of farming alongside land-tenure reforms.52 The new emphasis on
land and social reform went deeper than the bureaucracy’s running
battle with Sind’s landlord-dominated political classes, and fitted with
the broad moralizing aspects of ‘nation-building’ which characterized
early post-Independence discourse in Pakistan. The centrality of
people—of the patriotic individual’s efforts and sacrifices—in these
discussions would seem to oppose the centrality of engineering
and materiality in British-era Lloyd Barrage discourses. Indeed, the
officials and citizens who spoke and wrote about the Kotri and Gudu
Barrages spoke to a sovereign nation-state rather than an imperial
state. Accordingly, the later rhetoric stressed the Pakistani nation’s
need for food to eat and to export, whereas Sukkur-era rhetoric had
almost exclusively stressed the prosperity that the project would bring
to Sind itself. But, even leaving aside the continued valorization of
technology and engineering that can be seen regarding the Kotri
and Gudu projects, this theme reiterates one of the foundational
premises of the ideology expressed with relation to the Lloyd Barrage:
namely, that Sindhi agriculture was fundamentally ‘backward’ and
unproductive. The declaration that this should be changed was now
made in the name of the nation, rather than in the interests of
Sindhis, and Sindhi landlords were explicitly held culpable for the
state of affairs. The imposition of this change on the population by the
government, through large-scale irrigation projects which required
the intensification of agriculture and the adoption of new farming
techniques, was unerringly similar. Moreover, the changing regimes
all exploited the idea that the construction of an irrigation project
could fundamentally alter Sindhi society for the better. This very fact
belied the continuation into post-Independence Pakistan of the British
ruling class’s paternalist, autocratic response to the perceived need
to raise food production and land revenue. The basic idea that the
government had a right, and even a duty, to educate the cultivators in
the ‘correct’ ways of farming appeared in 1962, the year that the Gudu
Barrage became operational, as strongly as it had in 1932. According
to a report in Dawn, the Chairman of the West Pakistan Agricultural
Development Corporation:
52 ‘Sind Agriculture: its past present and future [sic]’ in n.a., Sind People and Progress
(N.p.: Directorate of Information Sind, n.d., n.p. n.).
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[E]xhorted the cultivators and field workers to work in closest cooperation
and make the development programme for the Gudu Barrage area a complete
success. [. . .] The Corporation was now leading and co-ordinating all work
connected with land development, colonisation, agricultural extension and
intensification, cropping pattern and such other activities. Nevertheless,
he added, only hard work on the part of everybody concerned and full
utilisation of agricultural supplies like good seeds, fertilisers, credit facilities
and improved implements could produce the necessary increase in acreage
and production.53
Again, the material fact of the Barrage required technical and
cultural changes in the way that cultivators operated and, again, the
logic of the project’s execution—increased agricultural output, leading
to increased prosperity for the province or nation—required the
compliance of cultivators with an official-led vision of how agriculture
should be practised.
This continued the colonial discourse of the triumph of British
scientific irrigation over the native cultivator’s techniques, with
the independent state taking on the colonial state’s self-promoting
ideological role. The implication that Pakistani agriculture needed
to be fundamentally altered to overcome food shortages and political
instability, and to contribute to Pakistan’s foreign exchange position,
ran through the speeches and newspaper reports associated with the
Kotri and Gudu Barrage ceremonies. Although the political context
of these needs had changed since the 1930s, a direct discursive
line can still be drawn between the ideas of ‘progress’ deployed
in relation to the three projects. Moreover, the colonial and early-
independent states followed near-identical trajectories in approaching
the challenges faced by agriculture in an arid country. Throughout
the period under discussion, the renovated irrigation systems—
with the new Barrages as their symbolic, as well as technical,
lynchpins—were made to stand for the virtually unquestioned idea of
‘progress’. The discourses which accompanied the Barrages’ openings
allotted them political meaning: not just in the immediate politics
of the respective eras, but also in the deeper structural control
exercised by an elitist, paternalistic, bureaucratic administration
with overwhelming military backing. Both states attempted to cast
themselves in the role of champion of modernity, as against the
perceived backwardness of Sindhi landowners and cultivators. The
reservation of knowledge which was embedded in this discourse was,
53 ‘Farmers asked to work hard’, Dawn, 22 December, 1967.
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of course, open to contestation, as Khuhro and Ghulam Mohammad’s
attempts to ‘out-modern’ each other suggest. But the ceremonies
demonstrated the durability and pervasiveness of an ideology which,
rightly or wrongly, promoted national ‘progress’ as a scale on which
technology-intensive irrigation projects ranked above the habits and
attitudes of the majority of the population.
